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Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court and the Question
of Intervention
On September 13, 1990 the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) Judgment by an ad hoc chamber of the Court, did something unprecedented in the history of the I.C.J.; it granted Nicaragua the right to
intervene in the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras concerning
their land, island, and maritime borders.1 This decision raises a great
number of issues, not only because this is the first time permissive intervention was granted, but also because the decision was reached by a selected chamber of the International Court. The court rules concerning
the ad hoc chamber proceeding, as presently constituted, were most recently revised in 1978. The application of these rules has caused considerable controversy. 2
In part I, the historical background of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, the circumstances which brought both parties to submit the dispute to a chamber of the I.C.J., and the decision of the
Chamber to grant intervention are examined and analyzed. In part II, a
brief history behind the development of the ad hoc chambers is offered,
as well as an examination of the previous cases in which this relatively
new procedure has been used. Whether or not the Chamber was the
proper body to hear the application to intervene will be addressed in part
III. Two arguments are raised in this Note. First, the full Court should
have heard this case to settle the many unresolved issues that surround
permissive intervention. Second, the present method of composing
chambers is not proper when considering the fundamental purpose of the
Court and the long term implications of giving parties a role in selecting
judges.
I Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 92, 137, Application by Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene (Judgment of Sept. 13) [hereinafter Order for Inter-

vention]. The International Court of Justice is established by articles 7 and 92 of the U.N. Charter
as the "principal judicial organ" of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. The Court is
regulated by the Statute of the Court, which was drafted in 1945 in San Francisco along with the
Charter to the United Nations. SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How
IT WORKS 26 (1989) [hereinafter WORLD COURT]. The Statute is essentially based on the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.). Id. The judges to the Court are elected
both by the General Assembly and by the Security Council for a period of nine years, with the terms
of five judges ending every three years. Id. at 61. The seats of the Court are regionally distributed by
a complex process according to article 9 of the Statute and the principal of "equitable geographical
distribution." Id. at 52-61.
2 Andreas Zimmerman, Ad Hoc Chambers of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 8 DICK. L.
R v. 1, 2-3 (1989).
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INTRODUCTION

The border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras has historical causes that extend as far back as the 16th century when Spanish explorers divided the Central American region.3 The dispute resulted in a
war between the two countries called the "Soccer War." It was called
the "Soccer War" because it occurred after a World Cup soccer match
between the countries, on June 15, 1969.' Along with this dispute over
the demarcation of the border, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
have also disputed the division of waters and islands in the Gulf of
Fonseca.'
After the 1969 war, both El Salvador and Honduras attempted to
negotiate their dispute, and on October 30, 1980 signed a General Peace
Treaty in Lima, Peru.6 The peace treaty stated that the parties would
attempt to resolve the dispute within five years.' While three-quarters of
the border was established, the countries were unable to reach solutions
for seven small pockets of land, the Gulf, and several small islands.' On
December 11, 1986, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Honduras and the Republic of El Salvador submitted a Special Agreement to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice which the
parties had signed on May 24, 1986, in Esquipulas, Guatemala.9 In the
agreement, which entered into force on October 1, 1986, the parties established the border for the sections which they could agree upon, and,
3 Centuries Old Border War Continues, UPI, May 7, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
4 See Honduras,El Salvadore OK Arbitration, Facts on File World News Digest, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File. See also Maritime Incident HighlightsSalvadorean- Honduras
Dispute, Reuter Library Report, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
5 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 100, para. 23. The Gulf lies on the Pacific Ocean in a
south-westerly direction. All three countries border the Gulf of Fonseca, with El Salvador on the
northern shore, Nicaragua on the southern shore, and Honduras on the coast in between. Within
the Gulf there are many islands, some of which are the subject of the dispute between El Salvador
and Honduras. Id. at 101, para. 24.
6 Dateline: Lima, Peru, UPI, Oct. 30, 1980, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file;, El
Salvador, HondurasOK Border Pact, Renew Ties, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR (Midwestern Edition),
Oct. 20, 1980, at 2.
7 Salvadoran, Honduran PresidentsDiscuss Border Dispute, UPI, July 10, 1985, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
8 El Salvadore and Honduras Take BorderDispute to World Court, Reuters North European
Service, Dec. 16, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
9 Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hon.), 1987 I.C.J. 10, 10-11 (Constitution of Chamber, Order of May 8) [Hereinafter Order for Composition]. The Special Agreement
was entitled "COMPROMIso ENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETER A LA DECISI6N
DE LA CORTE INTERNACIONAL DE JUSTICIA LA CONTROVERSIA FRONTERIZA TERRESTRE, INSULAR Y MARiTIMA ExIsTENTE ENTRE Los Dos ESTADOS, SUSCRrrO EN LA CIUDAD DE ESQUIPULAS, REPU3LICA DE GUATEMALA, EL DIA 24 DE MAYO DE 1986." Id at 11. The parties were
unable to reach an agreement on a version translated into French or English, the official languages of
the Court. Id.
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pursuant to the General Peace Treaty, submitted to the International
Court of Justice the dispute on the sections which they could not agree
upon. 10 However, in this special agreement, the parties stated that they
wished to have the dispute heard by an ad hoc chamber of the Court,
pursuant to article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and article 17, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the Court."
The agreement further stipulated that the chamber would be composed
of five judges; three from the Court, and two ad hoc judges, one selected
party, pursuant to article 31, paragraph 4, of the Rules of
by each
12
Court.

By its Order of May 8, 1987, the Court agreed to honor these requests and created the Chamber to delimit those areas of the border, as
well as to divide the islands, which were left in dispute.1 3 The Court also
conceded to the parties' requests in the agreement concerning the procedure which the Chamber would follow and the time limits for the pleadings.1 On November 17, 1989, Nicaragua submitted to the full Court its
request to intervene in the chamber proceedings concerning the Gulf of
Fonseca. 5

In its request to intervene, Nicaragua specifically stated that it only
wished to intervene in those aspects of the proceedings which involved
the Gulf of Fonseca.1 6 Nicaragua asked to intervene under article 62 of
the statute, which requires that the party seeking to intervene "has an

interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision.'"' 7

In order to support its argument that it had a legal interest in the
10 M~moire du Gouvernement de la R~publique du Honduras (El. Sal. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J.
PLEADINGS I (Land, Island and Maritime Dispute) (June 1, 1988). This is the document which the
Government of Honduras submitted to the Chamber in its first hearing on the Land, Island, and
Maritime Dispute on June 1, 1988. (copy on file with the Case Western Reserve Journal of Int'
Law).
11 Order for Composition, supra note 9, at 11-12.
12 Id. at 12.
13 Id. Following this Order, Judge Oda made an interesting declaration, stating that while,
under article 17, paragraph 2, of the rules, the President of the Court must ascertain the views of the
parties concerning the composition of the Chamber, and, for practical purposes the Court must
reach a consensus with the parties on the composition, "the process of election whereby it comes into
being should be as judicially impartial as its subsequent function." Id. at 13.
14 Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.) 1987 I.C.J. 15, 16 (Order of
May 27).
15 Land, Island, And Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Application for Permission
to Intervene by the Government of Nicaragua (filed Nov. 17, 1989). [hereinafter Application to
Intervene] (copy on file with the Case Western Reserve Journalof InternationalLaw).
16 IL at 4, para. 5.
17 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 62, para. 1, 1978 I.C.J. Acts. & Doc. (No.
4) 60 [hereinafter Statute of the Court]. The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides
that, "[should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the
decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene." Id.
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ongoing case between El Salvador and Honduras, Nicaragua advanced
seven considerations.18 Nicaragua addressed its application to the full
Court rather than the Chamber because it felt the "matter [was] exclusively within the procedural mandate of the full Court."19 Nicaragua
maintained that as the Court decided in the Monetary Gold Case, it
would be improper for the Chamber to exercise jurisdiction without the
consent of a third State, whose substantial interests were the very subjectmatter of the dispute.2 0 Secondly, Nicaragua maintained that it was in a
disadvantaged position since the Chamber and its procedural agenda was
formed by two of the three coastal states involved in the dispute, which
threatened the equality of Nicaragua before the Chamber.2" In conclusion, Nicaragua requested that the full Court's result grant its motion to
intervene by reforming the Chamber that was constituted, as well as reordering the procedure of the Chamber.2 2 The full Court, on February
18 Application to Intervene, supra note 15, at 4, para. 2. The following considerations were
advanced by Nicaragua:
(a) The phrasing of paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Special Agreement, which refers comprehensively to, "lasituaci6n juridica insular y de los espacios maritimos."
(b) The title of the Special Agreement which refers to, "la controversia fronteriza terrestre,
insular y maritima existente entre los dos Estados."
(c) The geographic situation in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime area.
(d) The essential character of the legal principles, including relevant equitable principles,
which would be relevant to the determination of the questions placed on the agenda by the
Special Agreement.
(e) The gineral recognition by authoritative legal opinion that the issues relating to the
Gulf of Fonseca involve a trilateral controversy.
(f) The leading role of coasts and coastal relationships in the legal regime of maritime
delimitations and the consequences in the case of the Gulf of Fonseca that it would be
impossible to carry out a delimitation which took into account only the coasts in the Gulf
of two of the three riparian States.
(g) The fact that a possible element in the regulation of the legal situation of maritime
spaces, especially in a case like that of the Gulf of Fonseca, would be the designation of one
or more zones of joint exploration and exploitation: see the Report of the Conciliation
Commission in the Jan Mayen ContinentalShelf case, International Law Reports (ed. E.
Lauterpacht), Vol. 62, p. 108.
Id. at 4, para. 2.
19 Id. at 4.
20 Id. at 8, para. 12. In the Monetary Gold Case, 1954 I.C.J. 32, the Court addressed the issue
of whether proceedings may continue in a case in which the subject matter of a case involves the
legal interests of a state which is not a party to the dispute before the court. The I.C.J. held that if
the state's legal interests are the very subject matter of the dispute, proceedings could not continue if
that state is not a party. Id.
21 Application to Intervene, supra note 15, at 8,para. 13. Nicaragua cited to a decision by
another,4d Hoc Chamber of the International Court of Justice used in the Gulf ofMaine Case, 1984
I.C.J. 246, a case concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine. In this
case the Chamber concluded that, "any delimitation must be effected by agreement between the
States concerned, either by the conclusion of a direct agreement or, if need be, by some alternative
method, which must, however, be based on consent." Id. at 292, para. 89.
22 Application to Intervene, supra note 15, at 12, para. 23. Alternatively, Nicaragua requested
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28, 1990 decided that the Chamber, as constituted on May 8, 1990 was
the proper body to decide this issue. 23 The Court permitted the parties to
offer their views on the matter. While three judges dissented vigorously,
the majority held that since the Chamber was formed pursuant to the
Statute of the Court, and since the Chamber was seised of an issue, they
had the power to deal with incidental proceedings arising from that
case. 24 The Court stated the rule of law, which it established in The
Haya de la Torre Case, that "every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case."' 25 The Court noted that altering the composition of
the Chamber, or alternatively, limiting the mandate of the Chamber to
exclude the issue of the Gulf, was only contemplated in the event that its
motion to intervene was granted. 26 Therefore, the Court concluded that
it did not have to decide those issues, and that the Chamber formed was
the proper body to decide whether Nicaragua's application should be
granted.27 In a separate declaration, Judge Oda expressed the view that
the Court did not have to form an order to reach its conclusion. 28 However, Judges Elias, Tarrasov, and Shahabuddeen dissented from the opinion of the Court, each deciding that the Chamber was not the proper
body to hear the application based on its composition.2 9
Following this decision, Nicaragua made its request to intervene
before the Chamber.30 Honduras stated that it had no objection to Nicaragua intervening in the dispute as far as the matter concerned the Gulf
of Fonseca.3 1 Contrary to this position, El Salvador stated that it wished
the Chamber to reject the request by Nicaragua to intervene, arguing
that Nicaragua failed to fulfill the requirements of article 81 of the Rules
that the full Court exclude from the mandate of the Chamber "any powers of determination of the
juridical situation of the maritime areas both within the Gulf of Fonseca and also the Pacific Ocean."
Id at 12, para. 24.
2 Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 3, Application for Permission to Intervene (Order of Feb. 28). [hereinafter Order of February 28].
24 Id. at 6. To support its contention that it could decide incidental proceedings, the Court
pointed to the two previous cases in which the chamber procedure had been used; the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 3, Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures
(Order of Jan. 10) [hereinafter Provisional Measures], and Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy),
1989 I.C.J. 15, (July 20). In both cases, matters not directly involved in the dispute were considered
by the Chambers (these cases will be discussed infra).
25 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 4. See also The Haya de la Torre Case (Colom. v.
Peru), 1951 I.CJ. 71, 76 (Judgment of Dec. 13).
26 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 5.
27 Id. at 6.
28 Id at 7. Judge Oda stated that "[the competence of the Chamber formed under Article 26,
paragraph 2, of the Statute to deal with any application to intervene is, in my view, unequivocally
established." Id.
29 Id. at 6, 9-63. These dissenting opinions will be further examined in part III, infra.
30 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 98, para. 14.
31 Id. at 99, para. 20.
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of Court, which establish the requirements for permissive intervention

under article 62.32 El Salvador also argued that Nicaragua's request to
reconstitute the Chamber would "infringe Article 26, paragraph 2, of the
Statute."3 3 Addressing itself only to this issue, the Chamber concluded
that the request to reconstitute the Chamber was not contingent on
whether the request to intervene should be granted. 34 At the public sittings which were held, Nicaragua stated that it accepted the Chamber as
being properly seised of the dispute, and placed its application before the
Chamber except for the request to reconstitute the Chamber. 31 On September 13, 1990 the Chamber concluded that Nicaragua had "shown

that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by part of
the Judgment of the Chamber in the case," but this interest did not involve the delimitation of the waters or island in the Gulf, or any decision
on the maritime spaces outside the Gulf.36 Thus, the permissive intervention was limited to the issue of method by which the Chamber would
delimit the Gulf, since both El Salvador and Honduras had put forward
different theories on how this should be done.3 7
The Chamber, for the first time in the history of the International
3
Court, granted a state the right to intervene under article 62. 1 In granting Nicaragua the right to intervene, the Chamber attempted to answer
many outstanding questions concerning the procedural status of the state
wishing to intervene under article 62, such as what constitutes an interest
of a legal nature, and whether the intervener must show that it has a
separate dispute with the parties.3 9 While, under article 27 of the statute,
the decision by the Chamber is equivalent to a decision by the full Court,
32 Id. at Ill, para. 44. El Salvador stated that Nicaragua failed to meet article 81(2)(c) of the
rules requiring the requesting state to set out any basis ofjurisdiction between itself and the parties in
the dispute. Rules of Court art. 81, para. 2(c), 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Does. (No. 4) 92 [hereinafter Rules
of Court]. El Salvador also contended that Nicaragua did not state the precise object of its request to
intervene, required under article 81 (2)(b). Id. art. 81, para. 2(b). For the language of article 81, see
infra note 116.
33 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 113, para. 47.
34 Id. at 113, para. 48.
35 Id. at 110, para. 42. Under the rules of the I.C.J., since one of the parties to the dispute
objected to Nicaragua's application to intervene under article 62, a public sitting had to be held, in
order for Nicaragua to be heard. Rules of Court, supra note 32, at art. 84, para. 2.
36 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 137.
37 Id. at 136, para. 104. Both Honduras and El Salvador put forward different theories on how
the Gulf should be divided. Honduras argued that the Gulf should generally remain undivided,
being held in a state of communion between El Salvador and Honduras, whereas El Salvador argued
that delimitation lines should be drawn both inside and outside of the Gulf. Id.
38 Keith Highet, Editorial Comments: The Peace Palace Heats up: The World Court in Business Again? 85 AM. J.INT'L L. 646, 649 (1991). Prior to this decision there was a general lack of
interest on the part of states to use intervention procedures. C.M. Chinkin, Third-PartyIntervention
Before the InternationalCourt of Justice, 80 AM. J.INT'L L. 495 (1986).
39 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 131-135. A full discussion of the unresolved jurisdictional requirements for intervention are discussed in part III (A), infra.
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it is only the decision of five judges, two of whom were directly selected
by the parties.' Given this fact, the full Court should have decided the
application of Nicaragua to intervene in order to address and conclude

upon the unresolved issues of intervention. This also points to the larger
debate concerning the role of parties in the composition of chambers.

Should the Court take into account the views of the parties, or is this
inconsistent with the nature of the Court as a court of justice? While it
may lead to a greater willingness on the part of parties to submit disputes

to the Court, will it in the long run, result in a court that only sits as a
court of chambers, in which the parties expect to pick the members of the
chamber? Will the status of the Court eventually be relegated to a per-

manent court of arbitration, rather than a court as is traditionally understood? These policy questions, when considered with the basic purpose
of the Court, argue that the present chamber procedure is not proper for

resolving disputes of general international law.
II.

HISTORY AND USE OF THE AD

Hoc CHAMBER

Before reaching the above-mentioned arguments, an examination of
the history and use of the ad hoc chambers would be beneficial. By understanding the purpose behind the ad hoc chamber system, it will be
easier to judge whether employment of the chamber procedure was
proper in this case.
A.

History
1. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice

The Statute of the International Court of Justice, was based primarily on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(P.C.I.J.)./" In the case of article 26 and article 27 of the P.C.I.J., the
chamber was formed at the request of the disputing parties, and both
40 Statute of the Court, supra note 17, arts. 27 & 29. Under article 31, paragraph 4 of the
statute, the parties may select a judge of their own nationality to sit on the Chamber, if the composition of the Chamber is such that it does not have a judge of that nationality. Thisjudge is referred to
as an ad hoc judge. See id. art. 31, para. 4.
41 Statute and Rules of the Court and Other Constitutional Documents, Rules or Regulations,
1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No.1 (3d ed.), at 17-18 [hereinafter Statute and Rules of the Court]. See also
MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942, 175-180
(1943). More specifically, the Permanent Court of International Justice was created in 1920 by an
international committee of jurists and adopted by the League of Nations. Id. at 85. The purpose of
the P.C.I.J. was to hear disputes between the members of the League of Nations. Id. at 383. In
1936, the P.C.I.J. adopted its Rules of Court to address questions of procedure. Id. at 270-71.
Under articles 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the statute of the P.C.IJ., chambers of the court could be formed
in particular cases. Under article 26, a Chamber for Summary Procedure could be created for labor
cases, and under article 27, a chamber for transit cases and communication cases could be formed.
Statute and Rules of the Court supra, at 18.
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chambers were subject to the provisions of article 9.42 Article 9 provided
that the chambers, as well as the body of the whole court, should repre-

sent the main forms of civilization and principal legal systems of the
world.43 However, neither of these chambers were convened by the Per-

manent Court. The Chamber for Summary Procedure, a third type of

chamber provided for in article 29, was used twice by the P.C.I.J.4 The
members of the Chamber were to be elected annually by the Court.' In
1929, the statute was amended to include provisions for ad hoc judges to
be appointed by the parties to the chambers, but this did not increase the
interest in the procedures by the members of the League of Nations.4 6
2.

The Washington Committee of Jurists and the San Francisco
Conference

In 1945, the newly formed United Nations Committee of Jurists met
in Washington to revise the Statute of the P.C.I.J.4 7 At the Washington
Committee Conference, a proposal was put forward to do away with the
specific categories of chambers in favor of a general power by the Court
to occasionally form chambers composed of three or more judges, to deal
with particular types of cases.4a In San Francisco, the work of the Washington Committee was adopted into the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) at the United Nations Conference on International Organizations.49 Several articles of the P.C.I.J. concerning the
42 Statute and Rules of the Court, supra note 41, at 18. See also Stephen M. Schwebel, Chambers of the InternationalCourt of JusticeFormedfor ParticularCases, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT
A TIME OF PERPLEXrry 739 (Y. Dinstein ed., 1989).

43 Statute of the Court, supra note 17, at art. 9. Article 9 states:
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be
elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a
whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principle legal systems
of the world should be assured.
Id. Article 9 was adopted as part of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
44 Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 2. According to the research of Professor Zimmerman, the
chamber procedure was used in 1924, in a dispute between Greece and Bulgaria over a dispute
concerning the Treaty of Neuilly, and, again, in 1935, in connection with a request to appoint members of an arbitral tribunal. Id. See also James N. Hyde, A Special Chamberof the International
Court of Justice-An Alternative To Ad Hoc Arbitration, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 439 (1968).
45 Hyde, supra note 44, at 440.
46 Schwebel, supra note 42, at 739-40 (also printed in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987)). Today,
this amendment is located in article 31, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. For a discussion of article 31, paragraph 4, see supra note 40.
47 Schwebel, supra note 44, at 740.
48 Id. This proposal was first suggested by the British delegate, and later adopted by the
American delegate. Id.
49 COMMISSION IV: JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION, SUMMARY REPORT OF MEETING OF COMMISSION AND COMMITTEE OFFICIERS, May 3, 1945, reprinted in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 837 (1946)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
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chamber procedures were redrafted. As adopted, article 26 of the Statute
of the I.C.J. stated that the court may form chambers of three or more
judges to deal with particular types of cases; and that a chamber may be
formed at any time at the request of the parties, with the number of
judges to be determined by the Court with the consent of the parties.5 0
Article 27 provided that any decision rendered by the chambers may be
considered a decision by the Court." Article 29 of the P.C.I.J., which
allowed for a Chamber of Summary Procedure, was maintained in the
Statute of the I.C.J. 2
The Rules of Court of the I.C.J., which were adopted at the same
time as the Statute of the I.C.J., were essentially a duplicate of the Rules
of Court for the P.C.I.J. 3 Under article 24 of the rules, Judges were to
be elected by secret ballot.5 4 One change which was later seen as significant was that article 9 of the Statute of the P.C.I.J. was deleted from
article 26 of the 1945 Statute of the I.C.J.55 Judge Manley 0. Hudson,
who was representing the P.C.I.J. at the Washington Committee Conference, made the comment that he considered the proposal for ad hoc
chambers in article 26 to be a "wholly different system when it provided
for ad hoc appointment of the chambers with the approval of the parties." 56 Thus article 26 was seen by at least one Judge as a significant
departure from the Statute of the P.C.I.J. On the whole, even though
little attention was given to the chambers, they were at least retained
with the hope that recourse to them would be facilitated."
50 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 26 (1945), reprintedin, DOCUMENTS, supra
note 49, at 970. Article 26 of the Statute of the International Court, as adopted in 1945, stated:
1. The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or
more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing with a particular category of cases;

for example labour cases and cases relating to transit and communications.
2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The
number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the
approval of the parties.
3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this article if the

parties so request.
Statute of the Court, supra note 17, art. 26.
51 Id., art. 27.
52 Id. art. 29.
53
ISRAEL
54

Shabtai Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 8
L. REv. 197 (1973) [hereinafter The 1972 Revision].

Id. at 205.

55 See Statute of the Court, supra note 17, art. 9.

56 Schwebel, supra note 42, at 742 (emphasis in original).
57 Shabtai Rosenne, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL

1978

RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT].

COURT:

A COMMENTARY

40 (1983) [hereinafter

ON THE

PROCEDURE IN

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L

3.

Vol. 24:667

The 1972 and 1978 Revisions of the Rules

Despite the hopes of the drafters, the chamber procedures remained
unused after the adoption of the statute.5" Due to the growing concerns
created by this non-use, the Court, in 1967, began a systematic revision
of its Rules of Procedure, with the intent of encouraging states to settle
their disputes by using the Court." Interest was focused on article 26(2)
of the statute as a means of achieving this end.'
The 1972 revision of the rules was at first intended to be a full-scale
redrafting, but the Court later decided only to amend certain provisions. 6 ' Prior to the Court's amending the rules, the General Assembly
in 1970, invited members to give their opinions on the role of the Court
through a questionnaire prepared by the Secretary General. 62 The response to these questions was that the Court should give the parties to a
dispute some influence in the composition of chambers created by the
Court under article 26(2).63 In an influential article written in the American Journal of International Law, Judge Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga,
President of the Court at that time, stated that the purpose of the 1972
Amendment was "to accord to the parties a decisive influence in the
composition of ad hoc Chambers."' 6 In response to the argument that
this would derogate from the purpose of having secret ballots for election
of members to serve on the Chamber, de Arechaga noted that under the
1945 statute, parties could request chamber proceedings in certain cases
and that article 9 was eliminated as a requirement of the Chamber.6 5
Under the 1972 rules changes, article 24(2) of the 1946 Rules of
58 Schwebel, supra note 42, at 745.

59 Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedureof the International Court of Justice, 67 AM. J.INT'L L. 1 (1973). The Rules of the Court were adopted in 1946,
and were a duplication of the Rules of the P.C.I.J. adopted in 1936. WORLD COURT, supra note 1,
at 15, 30, 72.
60 Edward Hambro, Will the Revised Rules of Court Lead to Greater Willingness on the Part of
Prospective Clients? in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE I.C.J. 365, 367 (Leo Gros ed., 1987). This interest
may have been sparked by the Beagle Channel Arbitration Case, Beagle Channel Case (Arg.v.
Chile), 16 R.I.A.A. 109 (1966) reprintedin 61 AM. J.INT'L L. 1071 (1967), in which Argentina and
Chile agreed to submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal, and picked five judges from the International Court of Justice as panelists.
61 PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 57, at 2.

62 de Arechaga, supra note 59, at 1. See also UN Doc. A/8382, at 6 (1970). Increasingly,
States suggested ways of activating the Chambers. At the 1968, 1969 Vienna Conference on Treaties, the U.S. suggested that the ad hoc chambers could be used to give advisory opinions on treaty
disputes. PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT supra note 57, at 40. Opinions were also

solicited from former judges, ad hoc judges, and international lawyers who had tried cases before the
Court. de Arechaga, supra note 59, at 1.
63 de Arechaga, supra note 59, at 1.
64 Id. at 1-2.
65 Id. at 3.
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Court was substantively changed and placed in article 26.66 Under article 26 of the 1972 rules, the President of the Court shall consult the
agents of the parties to ascertain their views regarding the composition of
the chamber. 67 The President shall then inform the Court of his consultations, after which the Court shall vote by secret ballot to elect the
chamber. 68 These changes were the result of redrafting by the Committee for the Revision of the Rules of Court. 69 The revision of the rules was
seen as a compromise between those who wished the parties to have a
decisive influence on the composition of the Chamber, and those who
wished the court to retain the secret election procedure. 0 The drafters of
article 26 of the rules noted that while the Chamber was selected in secrecy, since the consensus by the parties was necessary for continuation
of the proceedings, as a practical matter, it was highly unlikely that the
views of the parties regarding the Chamber's composition would be
ignored.71
The 1978 revision of the rules involved a comprehensive redrafting,
and the chamber procedures as developed, became included in articles
15, 16, 17, and 18.72 The procedure for ad hoc chambers was included in
article 17. Article 17 provides that either party may request a chamber
to be convened and, if the other party assents, the President of the Court
is to obtain the views of the parties regarding the composition of the
chamber.73 The rules have remained in this form since 1978. The provi66 PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 57, at 42.

67 Hambro, supra note 60, at 368.
68 Id
69 The 1972 Revision, supra note 53, at 199.
70 Id at 212.
71 See de Arechaga, supra note 59, at 3. de Arechaga noted that "itis difficult to conceive that
in normal circumstances those Members who have been suggested by the parties would not be
elected." Id. See also Hambro, supra note 60, at 368-369.
72 Monroe Leigh & Stephen D. Ramsey, Confidence in the Court: It Need Not be a "Hollow
Chamber", in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 113-114 (L.F.
Damrosch ed., 1987). See also WORLD COURT, supra note 1, at 71-72.
73 PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 57, at 38. Article 17 reads:
(1) A request for the formation of a Chamber to deal with a particular case, as provided
for in Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, may be filed at any time until the closure of
written proceedings. Upon receipt of a request made by one party, the President shall
ascertain whether the other party assents.
(2) When the parties have agreed, the President shall ascertain their views regarding the
composition of the Chamber, and shall report to the Court accordingly. He shall also take
such steps as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of Article 31, paragraph 4, of
the Statute.
(3) When the Court has determined, with the approval of the parties, the number of its
Members who are to constitute the Chamber, it shall proceed to their election, in accordance with the provisions of Article 18, paragraph 1, of these Rules.
Rules of Court, supra note 32, at art. 17. Under article 18, "[e]lections to all Chambers shall take
place by secret ballot." Id art. 18.
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sion which has created the greatest amount of controversy is article 17,
paragraph 2. While discussions and consultations of the Court are not
published, several scholars studying this revision have noted this particular new rule did not meet with unanimous court approval in 1972.' It
has been suggested that the alterations to the procedure in 1978 were
intended to ensure a balance of control between the Court and the parties
concerning the composition of the chamber. 75 The intent, however, was
clear that the Court wished to increase interest in the world community
in the use of the chambers. This was accomplished by giving the parties
some say in the composition of the chambers. The question which was
left outstanding, was how much say the parties should be given.
B.

Use of the Chambers Procedure

Since 1978, the chamber procedure created under article 26, paragraph 2 of the statute, and article 17 of the rules, has been used four
times, including this present case. A summary of these decisions demonstrates how the chamber procedures have been used, and the degree to
which the parties have influenced the chamber's composition.
1. The Gilf of Maine Case
The first case that used the chamber procedure was a dispute between the United States and Canada concerning the location of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine.76 The request for a chamber was
put before the Court in the Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty signed
by the U.S. and Canada." The text of the treaty provided that not only
the size, but also the composition of the chamber would be subject to the
parties approval. 7" The treaty also stated that if the International Court
failed to constitute the chamber as requested by the parties by the end of
six months, either party could terminate the Special Agreement. The
case would then be handled by an arbitral tribunal.7 9 This same provision applied to situations when a vacancy occurred on the chamber during the proceedings and the filling of the vacancy did not occur to the
I.C.J. RULES art. 17.
74 Hambro, supra note 60, at 369.
75 The 1972 Revision, supra note 53, at 43.
76 See Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to International
Law, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 478 (1979).
77 Id. See also Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, March 29, 1979, U.S.-Can., 33 U.S.T. 2797, 2802-2803.
For a more complete discussion of this case, see Robert M. Brauer, InternationalConflicts Resolution: The ICI Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L. 463 (1983).
78 Brauer, supra note 77, at 480.
79 Id.
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satisfaction of the parties.8 0 In a note written by the attorneys who
served as agents for their respective countries, the authors state that the
article by Judge de Arechaga, concerning the influence parties would
have on the composition, was what attracted the parties to the Court. 1
On January 20, 1982, the Court acceded to the requests of the parties, and formed a chamber after the President of the Court consulted
with them concerning the chamber's composition. 2 Judges El-Khani
and Morozov dissented from the decision of the Court. Judge Morozov
stated "in this situation, the sovereign right of the Court to carry out the
election independently of the wishes of the Parties, by secret ballot in
accordance with the provision of the statute and Rules of Court, becomes
in substance meaningless." 3 Judge Morozov concluded that the parties
had erroneously presumed that they may not only select the number of
judges, but propose names as well. 4 Judge El-Khani dissented as well,
stating that the time limit placed by the parties for the Chamber's formation and the imposition of a particular composition for the Chamber
"renders the Court no longer master of its own acts, deprives it of its
freedom of choice and is an obstacle to the proper administration of
justice." 5
Scholars studying the decision have noted that all the judges composing the Chamber were all North American or Western European.86
In a separate declaration, Judge Oda stated that the Court should have
made known the fact that for reasons "best known to itself," the composition of the Chamber was entirely in accordance with the latest wishes of
the parties.8 7 Many writers concluded that the decision, coupled with
the comments of Judge de Arechaga and others, signalled the predominance of the parties in deciding upon the composition of chambers."8
Responding to these comments on the case, Judge Schwebel noted
80 Id. at 481.

81 David R. Robinson et al., Some Perspectiveson Adjudicating Before the World Court: The
Gulf of Main Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 578 (1985) [hereinafter Perspectives].
82 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1982
I.C.J. 3 (Constitution of Chamber, Order of Jan. 20) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine]. Before forming the
Chamber, the Court put questions to the parties concerning the requirement by the parties that all
vacancies be filled with their approval. The parties responded that this was consistent with article 26
of the statute and articles 17 and 18 of the rules, because it is simply the parties stating the grounds
under which they may withdraw the case from the Court under article 88 of the rules. Id. at 5-7.
83 Id
841d at 5.
85 Id. at 7.

86 Id. at 7. Robinson, et al., respond to this criticism by stating that the parties in no way
preordained this result. Perspectives, supra note 81, at 583.
87 Gulf of Maine, supra note 82, at 8.
88 D.M. McRae, Notes and Comments, Adjudication of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 292, 296-97 (1979). See also Richard R. Baxter, Two Cheersfor
InternationalAdjudication, 65 A.B.A. J. 1185, 1189 (1979).
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that the decision had been accepted by all the parties, that this judgment
was subsequently used by the full Court in a later decision, and that the
decision did not show any signs of "regional particularity." 89 Likewise,
Attorneys Robinson, Colson and Rashkow, trying the case on behalf of
the U.S., stated that the parties should be free to select the judges within
the Court's rules and prerogatives. 90 Whether they praised or condemned the Court, legal scholars acknowledged the importance of the
decision in terms of future use of the chambers and the parties' control
over their composition.
2.

The Frontier Dispute

Within two years of the Gulf of Maine decision, Burkina Faso and
Mali, who were engaged in a border dispute, submitted a joint letter to
the Court requesting the formation of a chamber.9" The Court unanimously decided to accede to the request, and, in April of 1985, formed a
chamber to hear the dispute. 92 In constituting the Chamber, the Court
elected the members according to "the clearly expressed wishes of the
Parties." 93 The judges selected to sit on the Chamber included one African Judge (Algeria), one Eastern European Judge (Poland), and one
Latin American Judge (Argentina). 94 Thus, the Chamber showed no
particular regionalizationY5 The Chamber reached its decision quickly,
and it was accepted by both parties. 96 As previously noted, the Chamber
in this case was the first to deal with a matter incidental to the proceedings.97 In doing so, it was the first chamber to invoke article 41 of the
89 Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 831, 846 (1987). The case in which the full Court used the decision by the Chamber in the
Gulf of Maine Case was the Continental Shelf Case between Libya and Malta. See infra note 119.
90 Perspectives,supra note 81, at 583.
91 Monroe Leigh, JudicialDecisions, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 411 (1987). Both countries were part
of French West Africa, and their mutual border was defined by French colonial law prior to the
independence of both countries in 1960. Id. The dispute concerned a single strip of land which
included a major waterway. Id
92 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1985 I.C.J. 6 (Constitution of Chamber, Order of
Apr. 3) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute].
93 Schwebel, supra note 89, at 846.
94 Shigeru Oda, Notes and Comments, Further Thoughts on the Chambers Procedure of the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 556, 557-558 (1988).
95 Id. at 558. Pursuant to article 31, paragraph 4 of the statute, each party picked an ad hoc
judge since the Chamber did not have a judge from either Burkina Faso or Mali. Frontier Dispute,
supra note 92, at 6, 7.
96 The Chamber's decision in the case was to delimit the border area according to principles of
international law, and that it would be further demarcated by the parties with the assistance of a
panel of three experts which the Chamber nominated. Frontier Dispute (Bukina Faso v. Mali), 1986
I.C.J. 554.
97 Provisional Measures, supra note 24, at 3.
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statute, providing for provisional measures of protection.9"

3.

Elettronica Sicula (E.L.S.I.)

The third chamber to be constituted by the Court occurred when
the United States requested, and Italy agreed, to have their dispute heard
by a chamber. 9 9 The Court unanimously selected the members of the
Court to sit at the Chamber."° The Chamber in this case showed no
signs of regional particularity (again, excluding the ad hoc judges), with
two Asian judges (India and Japan), and a western European judge
(United Kingdom). 10 1 This Chamber, like the last two, was selected with
full conformity to the requests of the parties. 10 2 The Chamber also dealt
with a matter incident to the primary dispute for the first time.10 3
4.

Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute

The case that is the focus of this Note is the most recent case to use
the chamber procedures. It may be noted that the Chamber was formed
with full respect to the requests by the parties of the dispute as to who
should be on the Chamber, as with the cases above. The Special Agreement to submit the dispute to the Chamber stated that the parties consent to the composition of the Chamber, and this was an essential
condition for the composition of the Chamber."° In regard to all the
98 Id. at 11. See also Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 24-29. The provisional measures were
instituted due to an attack by Mali troops into Burkina Faso after an alleged problem caused by the
population census. The census was being taken in order to delimit the border. Provisional Measures, supra note 24, at 4. Article 41 of the statute provides:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require,
any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either
party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to
the parties and to the Security Council.
Statute of the Court, supra note 17, art. 41.
99 Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 3, 4 (Constitution of Chamber,
Order of Mar. 2). The United States sent its application along with a letter requesting that Italy
agree to the chamber procedure. Id
100

Id

101 Oda,

supra note 94, at 558.

102 Id. See also Schwebel, supra note 89, at 847.
103 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42 (Judgment of July 20).

The Chamber first had to address an objection by Italy concerning the failure of an American corporation involved in the dispute to exhaust local remedies in Italy. Id. at 21-22. It may be noted that
the U.S. initiated these chamber proceedings two years after it refused to appear in front of the full
court during the proceedings in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nic.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
104 Order for Composition, supra note 9, at 12. See also Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 17. The
special agreement to submit the dispute to a chamber of the Court also required that the number of
judges must also meet with the parties' approval. See the discussion of the Special Agreement, supra
note 9.
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chambers formed thus far, Judge Shigeru Oda has stated that while the
orders constituting the chambers did not express whether the parties submitted a list of names to the President while he was ascertaining
the
10 5
views of the parties, "it could hardly have been otherwise."
C.

ConclusionsFrom the History of the Chamber Procedure

From the history of the ad hoc chamber procedure, and from the
cases which have used the procedure, it can be stated that the Court has
altered the Rules of the Court to confront the serious problem facing it; a
lack of willingness on the part of disputing states to submit disputes to
the jurisdiction of the Court. Many member states of the United Nations
stated in their opinion, during the General Assembly review of the role of
the International Court, that the difficulty lies in the disputants' preference for a tribunal in which they have a say over the composition."0
While the views of the states are expressed in obscure language, scholars
have more bluntly stated that the reason for the lack of willingness on the
part of disputants rests on several factors, including a lack of trust for the
10 7
Court which stems from its election procedures and its composition.
This perception is especially true in the view of the United States.10 8
Given the emphasis of ensuring that the Court's composition is balanced
geographically, the perception of the Court has become that of a political
body rather than a judicial one."° It has also been stated that the
105 Oda, supra note 94, at 557.
106 Schwebel, supra note 89, at 836. See also Review of the Role of the InternationalCourt of
Justice: Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/8568, at 6 (1971).
107 Leigh & Ramsey, supra note 72, at 108-09. Leigh and Ramsey noted several factors which
lead to a perception of the Court as a partisan political organization. First, judges are elected in the
same manner as other U.N. organizations which leads to political bargaining in the election of candidates. Second, the candidates for a seat on the Court personally lobby on their own behalf at the
General Assembly meetings. Third, it is argued that the fact that the Court averages a change of five
judges every three years means that too many judges are being rotated too quickly. This increases
the political pressure on the judges, in the view of the authors. Id.
108 W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the United States Declaration Under Article 36(2) of
the Statute of the InternationalCourt, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE

71-103 (Anthony Clark Arend ed., 1986). In the

announcement by the State Department that the United States would not participate in the Court's
proceedings in the case brought by Nicaragua, the United States stated that the decision to hear the
case, "adds to the impression that the Court is determined to find in favor of Nicaragua in this case."
Telegram No. 017113 from the United States Dept. of State to the American Embassy at the Hague
(Jan. 18, 1985), reprintedin Marian N. Leich, ContemporaryPracticeof the United StatesRelating to
InternationalLaw, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 438, 440 (1985). In its announcement, the U.S. also noted
that "in the last decade or more. . .international organizations have become more and more
politicized against the interests of the Western democracies." IaL at 441. The U.S. concluded that a
politicized Court would result in an end to it as a respected institution. Id.
109 Leigh & Ramsey, supra note 72, at 108. See generally Edward McWhinney, Law, Politics
and "Regionalism" in the Nomination and Election of World CourtJudges, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& CoM. 1-28 (1986).
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Court's handling of several cases, notably the South West Africa Case 110
and the Case Concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and
Against Nicaragua, 1 has led some states to question the impartiality of
the Court.' 12 Thus, in order to persuade parties to bring their disputes
before the Court, and create confidence in its impartiality, the Court has
offered the chamber procedure.
However, as will be argued below, there are several unanswered
questions concerning the chamber procedures which have not been addressed, and which show that the chamber procedures now presently in
force make the Chamber an improper body to decide the present case.

III.

ARGUMENT AS TO WHY THE CHAMBER WAS NOT THE PROPER
BODY TO HEAR THE APPLICATION TO INTERVENE

There are two main arguments as to why the Chamber was not the
proper body to decide this issue. First, the Chamber was confronted
with the law of intervention which is an area with many unresolved issues. It was argued that these unresolved issues should have been confronted by the full Court. Second, given the method by which the
Chamber was created, with the parties having a substantial voice in its
composition, it is arguable whether this body was fit to make decisions
concerning Court procedure and pronouncements about general international law.
A.

The Issue of Intervention

The Chamber in this case was the first to decide in favor of a party
requesting intervention under article 62.113 Until recently, intervention
in Court proceedings was hardly ever discussed, due to the lack of use
and interest by states." 4 However, within the last decade three cases
concerning intervention were brought before the Court. One case was
between Tunisia and Libya, where Malta requested to intervene. An110 1966 I.C.J. 6.
111 1986 I.C.J. 14.

Leigh & Ramsey, supra note 72, at 109.
Article 62 of the statute provides that: "1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of
a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court
to be permitted to intervene. 2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request." Statute of the
Court, supra note 17, art. 62. This is known as discretionary intervention under the statute. See
PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 57, at 173. States may also intervene
under article 63 of the statute, which is known as intervention as of right. See John T. Miller, Jr.,
Intervention in Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice in 2 TiE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusncE, (L. Gross ed., 1976). The full Court decided that pursuant to
rule 26, paragraph 2, the Chamber was the proper body to decide whether Nicaragua may intervene.
Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 4. The full Court concluded that the issue of intervention
was an incidental proceeding to the particular case. Id.
114 Chinkin, supra note 38, at 495.
112
113
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other was between Libya and Malta, where Italy requested to intervene.
The most recent case was between Nicaragua and the United States,
where El Salvador requested to intervene. Prior to these three recent
cases, the only interventions in the history of the I.C.J. were in The Haya
de La Torre Case and the Nuclear Tests Case. 115
These cases left unanswered two related issues concerning intervention. First, what constitutes a legal interest under the statute. And second, must the intervening state provide an independent jurisdictional
link between itself and the parties to the principal dispute? 1 6 Independent jurisdictional links refers to the requirement that a state has an issue
with one or both of the parties which the Court could hear, independently of the issue in which the state wishes to intervene. 1 7 Other issues
that remained unaddressed concerned the status of the intervener in the
dispute once the intervention is granted, and whether an intervener may
appoint an ad hoc judge."'
115 Haya de La Torre (Colom. v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71 (Judgment of June 13) (Cuba intervening under article 63); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Application to Intervene, 1973 I.C.J. 320 (Order
of July 12) (Fiji requesting to intervene under article 62); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Application to
Intervene, 1983 I.CJ. 324 (Order of July 12) (Fiji requesting to intervene under article 62). See also
Miller, supra note 113, at 552-54.
116 J. G. Merrills, Intervention in the InternationalCourt, 101 L.Q. REv. 11, 12 (1985). Article
81, paragraph 2 of the rules sets down the requirements for allowing permissive intervention under
article 62 of the statute. Article 81 provides:
2. The application shall state the name of an agent. It shall specify the case to which it
relates, and shall set out:
(a) the interest of a legal nature which the State applying to intervene considers may
be affected by the decision in that case;
(b) the precise object of the intervention;
(c) any basis of jurisdiction which is claimed to exist as between the State applying to
intervene and the parties to the case.
Rules of Court, supra note 32, art. 81, para 2.
117 Jurisdictional links are defined by the Statute of the Court in article 36 and article 37.
Article 36 provides that the Court has jurisdiction over cases where the parties refer to it or where
the matter is specially provided for in the U.N. Charter or treaties or conventions in force. Parties
may recognize the jurisdiction of the Court "ipso facto" where the legal dispute concerns:
(a) interpretation of a treaty;
(b) questions of international law;
(c) existence of a fact which would constitute a breach of international law;
(d) nature and extent of reparations for breaches of international obligations.
Statute of the Court, supra note 17, art. 36. Article 37 of the statute provides for jurisdiction of the
Court whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for the dispute to be heard by the I.C.J. ICE
art. 37.
118 Chinkin, supra note 38, at 522, 526. The Court's decision concerning El Salvador's request
to intervene dealt with the issue of intervention under article 63 during the jurisdictional phase of the
Court's proceedings, and the necessity of holding a hearing to decide upon an application to intervene. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v.
U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Declaration of Intervention). It, therefore, falls outside the scope of this Note.
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1. The Prior Intervention Cases (The Continental Shelf Cases)
In the first of these cases, Malta attempted to intervene under article
62 in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf. The case involved a
dispute between Tunisia and Libya, and the Court was unanimous in
denying intervention.1 19 The Court found that Malta's purpose in requesting to intervene was simply to voice its concerns about the legal
principles by which the continental shelf should be delimited so that the
Court would set a precedent that Malta would find favorable.12 The
Court concluded that Malta's interests were not affected by its decision
in the present case.121 In its decision, the Court specifically stated that it
to prove jurisdictional
was not deciding whether an intervener needed
12 2
links between itself and the parties to the case.
However, three judges wrote separate opinions to the decision, each
expressing a view concerning the necessity for jurisdictional links, and
what was necessary for a state to have a legal interest. 123 One separate
opinion worth special attention is that of Judge Oda, since he was1 24a
member of the Chamber of the case that is the focus of this Note.
Judge Oda held that the right to intervene should have a far broader
scope than was permitted by the Court's judgment,1 25 and that the majority placed too restrictive a meaning on the terms in the Statute of the
Court allowing for Intervention. 1 26 Judge Oda disputed that permission
to intervene could only be granted if the would-be intervener could estab127
lish a jurisdictional link between itself and the parties to the dispute.
that
Looking at the statutory history of article 62, Judge Oda concluded
12
it was not clear whether a jurisdictional link was required. 1
119 Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1981 I.C.J. 3, 21 (application by Malta for permission
to intervene) (Judgment of Apr. 14) [hereinafter Malta].
120 Id. at 9-10. See also Chinkin, supra note 38, at 522.
121 Malta, supra note 119, at 20. The Court stated that "the interest of a legal nature invoked
by Malta cannot be considered to be one 'which may be affected by the decision in the case'" since
Malta wished to submit its views on application of principles of international law with respect to
itself and the parties to the dispute while attaching an express reservation that it is not putting its
own claims against the parties before the Court. Ia See also Merrills, supra note 116, at 14.
122 Malta, supra note 119, at 21.
123 Id. at 23-41.
124 Order for Composition, supra note 9, at 13.
125 Malta, supra note 119, at 24.
126

Id

127 Id at 26.
128 Id. at 24-26. Judge Oda concluded that a jurisdictional link may be necessary if the party
wished to participate as a full party. Id. at 26. While the statute drafted in 1945 copied the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Judge Oda argues that the addition of the term
"third party" to the 1920 English version does not necessarily indicate that an intervener must be
treated as a full Party to the dispute. Id. at 25. Judge Oda traces the possibility of a broader scope
for intervention to the Permanent Court of Justice sessions to discuss the Rules of Court. Id. at 2728. Judge Oda argues that a state may intervene without establishing an independent jurisdictional
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The second dispute is the Case Concerning the ContinentalShelf between Libya and Malta, in which Italy requested to intervene. This case
did little to solve the questions which remained concerning jurisdictional

ties and the scope of legal interests required under article 62.129 In rejecting Italy's application to intervene, the Court concluded that it would
be called upon to decide a separate dispute between Italy and one or both
of the principal parties.1 3 The Court stated that since a distinct dispute
was being raised by Italy, the principle of consent to jurisdiction applied
to the case, and article 62 could not be used as a means to avoid this
principle. 3 1 Again, the Court did not address the question of whether
the intervener had to establish an
independent jurisdictional link between
13 2
itself and the principal parties.
The Court's decision produced five dissenters who vigorously argued against the majority's decision and its interpretation of article 62.33
link, but not as a regular party, and will have a limited role. Id. at 28. This is due to the fact that
the right of intervention is not limited to a specific, well-defined right where the intervener's interest
is one defined by article 36 and article 37. IL Judge Oda uses the example of a situation in which a
third state is attempting to intervene in a case of sovereignty over an island, or a territorial boundary
dispute, because the third party may have a claim of sovereignty over the territories to be delimited.
Id. In an uncanny way, Judge Oda seems to envision Nicaragua's application to the Chamber nine
years before it occurs. Judge Oda concluded that Malta would be affected legally by a decision of the
Court, but the Court could not hear the application until it dealt with the primary case in determining the scope of the area affected by its decision. IaL at 31-35.
129 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1984 I.C.J. 3 (application by Italy for permission to
intervene) (Judgment of Mar. 21) [hereinafter Italy]. The Court's judgement of March 21, 1984 to
deny Italy's application to intervene resulted in an eleven to five decision, with four separate opinions
and five dissenting opinions. Id. at 28-29. In this case, the Court was asked to decide what principles of international law are applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Malta and
Libya. Id. at 14.
130 Id. at 20. In it application to intervene, Italy stated that its legal interest centered on the
fact that the parties, Libya and Malta, had submitted to the Court areas of the continental shelf in
which Italy felt it exercised sovereignty. Id at 17-19. The object of Italy's intervention was to
defend its rights concerning those areas. Id. at 19. However, the application to intervene stated that
it was not asking the Court to decide the how to delimit those areas of the continental shelf separating Italy from Malta or Italy from Libya. Id.
131 Id. at 23. The Court reasoned that if Italy were allowed to intervene, then it would have to
adopt the theory that article 62 was an exception to the requirement of consent to jurisdiction of the
Court to adjudicate a dispute. Italy, in its application to intervene, stated that it was not putting its
claims against either party before the Court. Yet the Court would inevitably be forced to make a
decision concerning Italy's rights, if the Court were to decide whether or not Italy had an interest in
a particular area and Italy were allowed to present arguments concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf. Id. at 22. The Court concluded that article 62 was not an alternative means for
bringing an entirely separate issue before the Court. Id at 23.
132 Id. at 28.
133 Id. at 29. The decision also produced four separate opinions. Judge Morozov affirmed his
separate opinion from the prior Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case in which Malta attempted to
intervene, stating that jurisdictional links were necessary before a third state could be granted the
right to intervene. Id. at 30. See supra note 121. The argument for independent jurisdictional links
was also advanced by Judge Nagrenda Singh, who argued that Italy was required to show an in-
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It is worthwhile to note that of the five dissenting judges, three, VicePresident Sette-Camara, Judge Oda, and Judge Sir Robert Jennings, consulted the Chamber in the Land, Island, and Maritime FrontierDispute
that granted Nicaragua a limited right to intervene (along with two ad
hoc judges selected by the parties)."' The decision to allow Nicaragua
was a decision by dissenters. An examination of the dissenters' opinions

shows that they conceive of a broader role for intervention than the majority of the Court seems to hold.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sette-Camara argued that, based on
the history of the drafting of the P.C.I.J. Statute, the Committee of Jurists was divided on the requirement of a jurisdictional link, therefore

there was no explicit requirement in the rules.135 The Vice-President further stated that the only requirement should be for the state to assert that

it has an interest of a legal nature.136 Sette-Camara, looking to the Rules
of Court, concluded that no sweeping requirement for proving jurisdictional links could be read into article 62 of the statute. 37 The majority
incorrectly treated the legal interests of Italy and the object of the intervention as the same question when they should have been kept separate.1 3 ' Treating them separately, the "legal interests" should have been

considered first since it was the main requirement of article 62.139 Under
Sette-Camara's analysis, the grounds under which the Court dismissed
Italy's request to intervene, should have been handled in a second
stage." 4 Therefore, the absence of the jurisdictional link, which the
Court stated that it did not decide upon, was the ground for denial. 4 1
dependent jurisdictional link between itself, Malta and Libya. Id, at 32. Judge Singh concluded
that, "the Court has made it abundantly clear that if the intervener expects a determination of any of
its claims, which involves an exercise of in adjudication, this would necessitate a jurisdictional link
between the parties to the dispute and the intervener." Id. at 33-34.
134 Compare Order for Composition, supra note 9, at 12 with Italy, supra note 129, at 29
(Judges Oda, Settle-Camara and Sir Robert Jennings dissenting).
135 Italy, supra note 129, at 71-73.
136 Id. at 74. Judge Sette-Camara argued that no proof was required "in a positive and indisputable way" to show the existence of the legal interest under article 62. Id.
137 Id. at 76. Sette-Camara, looking to the language of article 81, concluded that the language
of subparagraph c of paragraph 2 requiring a state to inform the Court of "any basis of jurisdiction
which is claimed to exist as between the State applying to intervene and the parties to the case" was
not clear as to whether it was a requirement for information or a prerequisite to being allowed to
intervene. Id. at 76. For a statement of the language of article 81, see supra note 116.
138 Italy, supra note 129, at 81. This view was also expressed by Merrills, who stated that, "to
arrive at its judgement the Court had to go behind the Italian application in a way which tends to
support the minority view." See Merrills, supra note 116, at 14.
139 Italy, supra note 129 at 81. Sette-Camara argued that Italy had clearly established its legal
interest in its application by pointing to the fact that the parties were asking the Court to decide the
principles that would be used to delimit the continental shelf in the central Mediterranean. A considerable area of this shelf borders on the coast of Italy.
140 Id at 84.
141 Id. at 85. Since Italy would meet the first stage of this analysis, Sette-Camara questioned
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Sette-Camara concluded that the Court was mistaken in its belief that a
need for a separate jurisdictional link was required because the Court's
jurisdiction link was established by the principal case, and intervention
was incidental to those proceedings. 142
Judge Oda, in his dissent, supported the opinion of Vice President
Sette-Camara by arguing that jurisdictional links were a necessity for intervention. 143 Judge Oda saw this question as interrelated with the issue
of whether the intervener was participating as a party, and whether the
judgment should be binding on the intervener." The majority's decision
concluding that an additional dispute would be created by the interven14
tion of Italy, indicated that a jurisdictional link would be required. 1
This decision, Judge Oda felt, continued the restrictive view that the
Court had placed on intervention. 146 Also looking to the history of the
drafting of article 62, Oda concluded that a preexisting jurisdictional link
was not an implicit prerequisite for intervention under article 62.147
the majority's decision finding of a separate and distinct dispute raised by Italy. Id. at 85. Since
neither Malta nor Libya stated there was a distinct dispute between themselves and Italy, and because Italy clearly identified the exact areas'where it had a legal interest in the continental shelf,
Sette-Camara questioned how the majority found a distinct dispute to be raised. Id. at 84.
142 Id. at 86. Sette-Camara reached this conclusion by arguing that the majority rested its
decision on the finding of a distinct dispute, which, Sette-Camara believed, was never proven. Id. In
Sette-Camara's view, intervention was incidental to the primary case (along with interim measures of
protection, interpretation and revision of judgements) before the Court, and therefore, the Court's
jurisdiction was already established. Id. at 87.
143 Id. at 97. Like Sette-Camara, Judge Oda believed that the Court's conclusion inevitably
rested on the failure to establish jurisdictional links which were necessary for a third state to intervene. Id. at 92.
144 Id. at 91.
145 Id. at 92.

146 Id. at 90. Judge Oda cites to his separate opinion from the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf
Case, arguing that intervention should be understood as being similar to municipal law in many
states. Id. at 92-93. Judge Oda argues that a jurisdictional link is not always necessary because a
case might arise in which a state has a claim in a case that is before the Court concerning two other
parties, where requiring an independent jurisdictional link would be unreasonable. Id. at 94. See
also supra note 128.
147 Italy, supra note 129, at 97. Judge Oda again relies on the history of the statute to determine that the original drafters did not intend the intervener to establish independent jurisdictional
links. Id. at 95-97. Oda holds that where a state is trying to protect a legitimate interest, as opposed
to attempting to join as a full party to the dispute, the scope of the intervention is different, and that
state should not have to prove independent grounds for a case parallel to the principal case. Id. at
98. In addition to these arguments which were made in the Tunisia-Libya case in which Malta
attempted to intervene, Judge Oda also cites to his separate opinion in discussing article 59, which
provides that decisions by the Court are only binding on the parties before the Court. See infra note
160. Oda argues that when the Court places a construction on a convention, that construction will
usually govern a subsequent case. Id. at 104. Oda concludes that in circumstances where a state
without a valid jurisdictional link will be bound by an interpretation of the Court, it should be
permitted to intervene as a non-party. Id. at 105. Oda argues this construction comes from cases
interpreting article 63, providing for intervention as of right. Id.
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The third judge, who dissented from the majority and who sits on
the Chamber in the Land, Island, and Maritime FrontierDispute, is Sir
Robert Jennings. In his dissent, Judge Jennings disagreed with the extent to which the majority asserted the argument that Italy could not
seise the Court of a new dispute that would require consent of one or
both of the parties. 4 8 Judge Jennings concluded that all that was necessary was that the intervener have a legal interest, in order to be allowed

limited intervention under article 62.149 Judge Jennings concured with
Vice President Sette-Camara that the under the Rules of the Court, there

was no requirement for a jurisdictional link to be established. 150 The
Court, in Jennings' view, was competent to grant limited intervention in

the case and the majority's decision represented the concern of allowing
intervention to become too broad.' 51

All three dissenters argued that independent jurisdictional links
were not essential to a request for intervention. Further, the issue of an
interest of a legal nature should be considered prior to, and independently of the question of whether there were independent jurisdictional

links.
2.

The Chamber's Decision to Grant Intervention in the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute

Having examined the uncertainty surrounding the requirements a
state must meet before it may intervene, and having focused on the dissenting opinions of the judges who composed the Chamber in the Land,
Island, and Maritime FrontierDispute, it is worth examining the Chamber's decision on the issues of jurisdictional links: what constitutes a legal
148 Italy, supra note at 129. Judge Jennings agreed with the majority that before Italy could
seise the Court of a dispute between itself and Libya or Malta it must have their consent. Id. However, Jennings held that if a state had a legal interest which it wished to protect in a case between two
other parties, absent a jurisdictional link, it could protect those interests. Id.
149 Id. at 149. In looking at the requirements of article 62, Jennings concludes that only the
principal of consent of the parties should be considered as a limitation on intervention once the
provisions of article 62 are met. Id. at 150. Jeninngs seems to divide the concept of intervention
under article 62 into limited intervention, which the application of Italy represents, and a broader
form of intervention in which the state joins as a full party to the case. Id. at 150-52.
150 Id. at 152. Like Sette-Camara, Jennings concludes that the meaning of the third subparagraph in rule 81 is to require an intervener to inform the Court of any independent jurisdictional ties
it might have, but it does not require a state to have them to intervene. Id.
151 Id. at 153-54.
From what it thus sees as an inexorable progression from safeguarding its rights to the
adjudgment of a new dispute, the Court finds safety only by refusing to take even the first
step. But if this reasoning is correct, then there is... virtually no practical possibility of a
third party ever safeguarding its rights by intervention under article 62, save when the
main parties have at some stage given their consent.
Id. at 154. Jennings concludes that the Court must allow intervention to prevent this result.
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interest, and whether the Court can allow intervention on a limited
scope. In its decision, the Chamber seems to adopt the approach that
Vice-President Sette-Camara recommended in his dissent in the LibyaMalta ContinentalShelf Case."2 The Chamber first considered whether
Nicaragua had a legal interest, and then, after resolving this question,
addressed the issue of Nicaragua's precise object of intervention.' 5 3 The
Chamber also felt obliged to answer the question of whether a jurisdictional link was necessary before a would-be intervener was granted permission. 5 4 The decision of the Chamber was that Nicaragua was not
required to prove jurisdictional links with either of the parties,' 5 and
56
that Nicaragua, under article 62, did not become a party to the case.'
The Chamber, thus, did use, and cited to, the full Court's majority opinion in the Libya-Malta ContinentalShelf Case,"' but seemed to adopt a
wider view of intervention that was first expressed in the Separate Opin152 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 116-136. The Chamber states that it must first
decide whether Nicaragua has a legal interest before it decides upon the scope of Nicaragua's intervention. Id. at 116. Thus the Chamber seems to be adopting the two stage analysis which SetteCamara proposed in the Libya-Malta case. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
153 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 116. The Chamber concluded that the scope of
Nicaragua's interest concerned the legal principal by which the Chamber would determine how the
waters of the Gulf of Fonseca would be delimited. Id. at 122. However in its decision, the Chamber
pointed out that while the Chamber's ability to decide the case was not affected by Nicaragua's
absence, Nicaragua fulfilled the requirements for intervention. Id.
154 Id. at 132-135. To decide this issue, the Chamber had to confront the issue of consent
raised by the majority's decision in the Libya-Malta case, in which the Court held that it could not
decide the case because neither Libya nor Malta consented to having a separate suit brought by Italy.
See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. The Chamber held that in the circumstance of
intervention, the Court was not dealing with a case brought before it by two parties. Rather, both
parties had already agreed by becoming parties to the dispute and had consented to the Court's
exercise of its powers under the Statute of the Court, which included article 62, allowing for permissive intervention. Id. at 133-134.
155 Order for Intervention, supra note 1, at 135. The Chamber concludes that article 62 was
not intended to allow the intervener to become a regular party to the case. Id. at 133. Thus, the
decision clearly reflects the opinions of Judge Oda, Jennings and Sette-Camara in the Libya-Malta
case, and the opinion of Judge Oda in the Tunisia-Libya case. All three strongly argued that a state
need not prove independent jurisdictional grounds for a third state to intervene. See Judge Oda's
separate opinion in the Tunisia-Libya case, Malta, supra note 119, at 24-35. See also Sette-Camara's
dissent in the Libya-Malta case, Italy, supra 129, at 71; Judge Oda's dissenting opinion, i. at 90;
Judge Jenning's dissenting opinion, id. at 148.
156 Order for Intervention, supra note 1 at 134-135. The Chamber states that "[i]f an intervener were held to become a party to a case merely as a consequence of being permitted to intervene
in it, this would be a very considerable departure from the principal of consensual jurisdiction." Iad
This conclusion comes from the Chamber's statement that article 62 only envisioned the intervener
presenting his arguments before the Court. Id. at 135-136. Therefore, no jurisdictional links were
required. Id. at 135.
157 Id. at 134. The Chamber cites to the full Court's decision, stating that nothing in article 62
was intended as an alternative means of bringing an additional dispute before the Court. Id
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ion of Judge Oda in 1981, during the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf
Case. 158

3.

Conclusion on the Chambers Decision Concerning Intervention

Given the unsettled questions of intervention before this decision
and given the fact that the decision above was written by judges all of
whom dissented from the majority in the Libya-Malta ContinentalShelf
Case, the full Court should have addressed the issues of what constituted
an interest of a legal nature and whether jurisdictional links were necessary.15 9 While the International Court of Justice is not a common law
court operating under the principle of stare decisis, many scholars and
judges acknowledge that the Court does rely on its own precedent to
support positions of international law.16 Without the full Court reaching a conclusion on the questions of jurisdictional links, interests of a
legal nature, and the scope of intervention once it is granted, this decision
may not be accorded the same weight that other decisions receive, even
though, under article 27 this is a decision of the full Court.16 1 The Court
158 IA at 135. The Chamber adopts the view that intervention under article 62 is a limited
intervention, in which proving independent jurisdictional bases between the intervener and the parties to the principal dispute are not a prerequisite to intervention. IA at 130-135. Thus the only
thing which Nicaragua needed to prove was an interest of a legal nature. Id. at 116.
159 See order for composition, supra note 9, at 12 (Judges Oda, Ago, and Sir Robert Jennings
were the dissenters); Italy, supra note 129, at 29 (Judges Oda, Sette-Camara, and Sir Robert Jennings dissenting).
160 Richard D. Kearney, Sources ofInternationalLaw and the InternationalCourt of Justice,
in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusncE 610, 696-698 (L. Gross ed., 1976).
Kearney, in his study of the development of international law, notes that "a striking feature of the
examination of the recent cases is reliance of the Court upon its own decisions in support of positions
as to applicable norms of customary law and general principles of law. This is particularly noticeable on jurisdictional issues." Id. at 697. Judge Philip Jessup, in examining the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case stated that the weight of precedent is great on the Court. Philip C. Jessup,
Editorial Comment, Intervention in the InternationalCourt, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 903, 908 (1981).
This view is echoed by Judge Oda in his dissent in the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case. While
article 59 of the statute provides: "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case," Statute of the Court, supra note 17, art. 59, Judge
Oda argues, "the provisions of Article 59 do not in fact guarantee a state which has not intervened in
the principal case any immunity from the subsequent application of the Court's interpretation of the
principles and rules of international law." Italy, supra note 129, at 105. Judge Robert Jennings in
his dissent in the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case stated, "the slightest acquaintance with the
jurisprudence of this Court shows that article 59 does by no manner of means exclude the force of
persuasive precedent. So the idea that Article 59 is protective of third States interest in this sense at
least is illusory." Id. at 157.
161 Article 27 of the statute states: "A judgement given by any of the Chambers provided for
in Articles 26 and 29 shall be considered as rendered by the Court." Statute of the Court, supra note
17, art. 27. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 27 (1945), reprintedin, DOCUMENTS, supra note 49, at 970. Given that the Court relies on its precedents to make general pronouncements of international law, in the area of intervention it is very questionable how comfortable
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will not develop a clear and concise jurisprudence concerning the requirements of permissive intervention.
The view that the Chamber was not the proper body to hear the
application to intervene is also expressed by two judges of the Court who
dissented from the majority opinion. 162 In his dissent, Judge Elias argued that the full Court should had heard the application to intervene
because the issue of intervention was one that was beyond the scope of
the chambers. 163 Judge Tarrasov also felt that the Chamber was not the
proper place for deciding a general matter of international law because
Nicaragua's request raised issues which the Chamber was not competent
to decide, and should only have been addressed by the full Court. 64
Contrary to this view, Judge Schwebel noted in his paper concerning
the ad hoc chamber system, that the decision of the Court in the Gulf of
Maine dispute had been readily accepted by the parties and had subsequently been applied by the full Court in the Tunisia Libya Continental
Shelf Case. 165

However, with questions of general principles of international law,
the full Court under article 9 is said to represent the principal legal systems of the world. On the other hand, the chamber reflects a consensus
between the parties to the dispute and the Court, with the parties having
substantial if not dominant impact on the judges. If the Court continues
to give the chambers latitude in deciding general principles of interna-

tional law, it may weaken the power of the Court to rely on its own
decisions, especially in cases where the full Court has been divided.
the full Court will be relying on the decision by this Chamber in the Land, Island, and Maritime
FrontierDispute.
162 See Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 6.
163 Id. at 10. Judge Elias argued that "[tihe chamber cannot be asked to undertake the finding
of general principles of public international law, and is therefore not given the same authority and
jurisdiction as the Court, unless specific provision is made in a particular case in the establishment or
provenance of the chamber." Id. Judge Elias also felt that the entire chamber procedure should be
overhauled since, as he argued, not enough "attention was paid to refining and considering its full
implication in the administration of justice." Id.
164 Id. at 12. Because Nicaragua's application raised questions concerning the composition of
the chamber, Judge Tarassov argued that only the full Court was capable of deciding those issues.
Id. Judge Tarrasov acknowledged that the parties not only decide the number of judges, but also the
personal composition of the chamber. Id. at 13. Since the intervening state was not on par with the
other parties, this "might be especially harmful to the intervening party if it were to seek the reformation of the existing composition of a chamber." Id. Judge Tarrasov also suggested that the
parties receptiveness to an application to intervene might have impact on their willingness to recompose a chamber. Id. at 14. At the very least, Judge Tarrasov felt that oral proceedings before the
full court were necessary. Id. at 16.
165 Schwebel, supra note 89, at 846. If the decision of the Chamber in the Land, Island, and
Maritime FrontierDispute is accepted the way the decision in the Gulf of Maine Case was, then a
fair evaluation of the impact of the Chamber's decision in future cases would be to suggest a more
liberal interpretation of intervention under article 62 of the statute. This decision is a significant
departure from the restrictive view which the Court has placed on this provision in the past.
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B.

Issue of the PartiesRoles in Selecting the Judges

The second argument against the Chamber's deciding on Nicaragua's application to intervene is the validity of the chamber procedure as
presently constituted. Also, there are strong policy arguments as to why
the chamber procedure should not used in its present form.
1. Constitutional Arguments Against the Present Chamber
Procedure
Dissenting from the decision of the full Court that the Chamber is
the proper body to hear Nicaragua's request to intervene, Judge
Shahabuddeen argues that the history of the Court's beginnings demonstrates that the present manner by which chambers are formed is inconsistent with the character of the Court. 16 6 Judge Shahabuddeen, looking
to the origination of the Permanent Court of International Justice, concludes that the intent of the framers of the Statute of the P.C.I.J. was
"[t]o create a Court of Justice in the sense generally understood under
municipal law." 161 While the changes in the Statute of the P.C.I.J. occurred in 1945, when creating the Statute of the I.C.J., it was understood
168
that the character of the Court was that it would sit as a full Court.
Shahabuddeen also states that when they were first introduced, the
1 69
chamber procedures were recognized as opposed to this character.
Since the Court is the "avowed guardian of its own integrity,"' 170 the
present chamber procedures cannot stand, for in effect the Court closes
166 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 25-34. Shahabuddeen argues that "Itihe whole
evolution of the thinking leading to the creation of the Permanent Court disclosed a settled intention
to create a court of justice in the sense generally understood in municipal law." Id. at 26. To
support his position, Shahabuddeen cites to the 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists which drafted
the Statute of the P.C.I.J. with the intent to create a new world court as distinct from an arbitral
tribunal. Id. at 28-30.
167 Id. at 26. Shahabuddeen goes on to say that "[a] principal feature of the new body was that
its judicial personnel were to be preordained." Id.
168 Id. at 29. Shahabuddeen cites to several cases in which he argues that the emphasis of the
Court as a court of justice has been maintained. Ide at 29-34. In the Northern CamaroonsCase, the
Court stated:
There are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a
court of justice, can never ignore. There may thus be an incompatibility between the
desires of an applicant, or, indeed of both parties to a case, on the one hand, and on the
other hand the duty of the Court to maintain its judicial character. The Court itself, and
not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity.
Northern Camaroons (Camaroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 29 (Judgement of Dec. 2).
169 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 31. Shahabuddeen relies on the reports of the 1920
Advisory Committee to the drafting of the Statute of the P.C.I.J. to state, "it was appreciated that
this [ad hoc chamber] arrangement evinced an arbitral aspect which was not quite in harmony with
the fundamental judicial character of the Court as a court of justice." Id.
170 Id. at 20.
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its doors1 71
to an applicant who wishes to dispute the validity of the
chamber.

A second argument against the validity of the chamber procedure as
presently constituted is that the procedure is inconsistent with article 26

of the Statute of the Court. 172 Looking at the records of the Washington

Committee of Jurists and of the subsequent United Nations Conference
on International Organizations in San Francisco, Judge Shahabuddeen
can find no support for the position that parties should have a role in
selecting judges. 173 Judge Shahabuddeen also argues that the rules as
presently constituted leave the provisions of appointing ad hoc judges
under article 31, paragraph 4 with no practical effect, showing that the
present procedure for creating ad hoc chambers is contrary to the intent
of the drafters of the statute. 74 Shahabuddeen concludes that the Rules

of the Court must be construed in light of the Court's statute, and that
both must be viewed in light of the Charter. 17

Because judges are to be

independent under article 2, Shahabuddeen argues, it is difficult to see
how under the present system, where for all practical purposes the parties select the judges to sit on the Chamber, the Chamber can dispense
the functions of the full Court and have their decisions treated as a decision of the full Court.1 76 Shahabuddeen concludes that the power of the
Court in its rule-making capacity is broad, although limited by the Statute of the Court, and the fundamental nature of the Court as a court of
justice.1 77 Thus, it cannot "convey away that power in whole or in part,
or share it with others, without destroying its essential character as a
171 Id. at 21. "The line between judicial restraint and judicial abdication has to be observed if
a judge's judicial mission is to be fulfilled." Id.
172 Schwebel, supra note 42, at 749.
173 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 34. Shahabuddeen notes that "[tlhe closest one gets
to any discussion of the matter is through Judge Hudson's much quoted statement in the Washington Committee of Jurists." Id. at 35. See Schwebel, supra note 42, at 741-744.
174 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 39. Shahabuddeen reasoned that since the procedure of seating an ad hoc judge, created in article 31, paragraph 4, involved asking an appointed
judge to step down in the place of the ad hoc judge, this entire procedure makes no sense in the case
where parties have a say in the composition of the chamber. Id.
While article 17 of the rules was amended in 1978 to recognize that article 31, paragraph 4, no
longer applied to ad hoc chambers, Shahabuddeen argues that since the drafters of the statute left
article 31 fully applicable to the ad hoc chamber procedure, the Court was not competent to amend
or override the statute by amending the rules. Id
175 Id. at 44. "It seems in any event clear that a constituent instrument cannot be read as
implying the existence of powers which contradict the essential nature of the organization which it
creates to exercise them." Id. at 41-42.
176 Id. at 45. Shahabuddeen sees great risk in allowing parties to exclude a judge from an ad
hoc chamber on the basis of the extent to which the country the judge comes from accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court. Id.
177 id. at 47-48. Shahabuddeen reiterates that the Rules of the Court can only be made within
the powers expressly given by the statute. Id. at 47.
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court of justice."' 178
In response to this argument of inconsistency with the statute, Judge
Schwebel argues that nothing in the statute forbids the President from
ascertaining the views of the parties with regard to the composition of the
Chamber. 17 9 In Edward Hambro's view, these constitutional concerns
are of little importance since the ultimate decision concerning the composition of the Chamber lies with the Court in its secret ballot.'8 0 This,
however, does not respond to the argument of Judge Shahabuddeen and
others that to give the parties the power to provide a list of names to the
Court, and have the right to terminate the proceedings if the Chamber is
not composed to their wishes, makes the secret ballot a meaningless exercise."' 1 Another argument raised is that article 9 of the statute, relating
to the global representation of the Court, no longer applies to the chambers in the 1945 draft, and therefore provisions for having parties give
their views to the President do not violate the Statute of the Court. 8 2
Shahabuddeen responds to this argument by stating that while article 9
no longer applies to the chambers, it cannot be read as legalizing the new
system. Shahabudeen argues that the effect of allowing parties to select
judges and having chambers act as the Court should be considered in
light of the3 fact that the I.C.J. is to act as the principal judicial organ of
8
the U.N.1
2.

Policy Arguments Against the Present Chamber Procedure

Aside from these constitutional questions concerning the validity of
the chamber procedure, there are also policy arguments against this procedure. One argument raised is that the procedure will result in a division of the Court based on ideological or geographic lines.18 4 The
procedure allows parties to choose judges as if they were selecting an
arbitration panel, which diminishes the status of the Court. 8 5 This procedure will in the long term slowly move the Court away from a Court of
Justice which sits in full, to a Court which will only sit as a Court of
Id. at 48.
179 Schwebel, supra note 42, at 750. See also Hambro, supra note 60, at 369.
180 Hambro, supra note 60, at 369.
181 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 43-44. Shahabuddeen argues that the new system
violates the free will of the Court that the secrecy provision was suppose to protect. Id at 43.
182 de Arechaga, supra note 59, at 3. de Arechaga makes this argument given two changes
that the Court made in the 1945 statute. The first change allowed for the constitution of the ad hoc
chambers; and the second change deleted the requirement of forming chambers with due regard to
article 9. de Arechaga argues that this indicates that allowing a decisive say in composition was not
against the drafters' intent. Id at 2-3.
183 Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 47.
184 Schwebel, supra note 42, at 749.
178

185 Id.
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Chambers, unable to make general rules of international law, or help
shape those rules as they develop.
The problems which led the Court to adopt new rules in 1978 may
not be solvable by simply giving the parties control over some of its
processes to strengthen disputants' confidence in the Court. Chamber
proceedings are not unusual in many courts of the World. Comparing
the chamber procedures of other international and multinational courts,
such as the European Court-of Human Rights, 18 6 the Court of Justice for
the European Community, 8 7 and other international organizations,"' 8
several conclusions can be drawn between other chambers and the chambers under the I.C.J. First, these chambers are formed solely by the
Courts without a role for the parties.' 89 Second, in contrast to the I.C.J.,
these courts are more narrow in their subject matter, and the participating states in the underlying treaties tend to share the same general legal
and cultural background. 90 Third, these Courts appear to be more suc186 The European Court of Human Rights sits in chambers of seven members, while members
of the States who are parties to the dispute sit as members ex officio. Paul Sherman, Procedural
Decisions of the European Courtof Human Right" 4 ComparativeStudy, 8 BROOK J. INT'L. L. 309,
316 (1982). See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 43, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 244. A dispute may be addressed to the plenary court if a
serious question concerning an interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights is
raised. Sherman, supra, at 316-17. Like the International Court of Justice, local remedies have to be
exhausted before a case may be heard by a chamber. Id. at 313. Unlike the I.C.J., individuals can
bring suits to court against their own country of nationality, and the chambers which hear the
disputes are selected on a yearly basis. Id Studies have shown that the Court is very successful in
having their decisions followed and in having disputants bring suits before the Court. Jane S. Jensen,
The Impact of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights on National Law, 52 CiNN. L.
REV. 760, 760 (1983).
187 The Court of Justice for the European Communities presently sits in six chambers with a
total of 13 judges. L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 26, 34 (3d ed. 1989). The provisions for the chambers are included in the
treaties under which the Court may hear cases; article 32 of the European Convention on Steel and
Coal; article 165 of the European Economic Community Treaty; and article 137 of the Euratom
Treaty. JOHN A. USHER, EUROPEAN COURT PRACTICE 172 (1983). Under the Court's Rules of
Procedure, the chambers hear preliminary inquiries, and due to the ever increasingly workload, since
1979, have been used in further matters of the Court. Id. at 176. Discretion of the numbers and
composition of the chambers is solely left up to the Court. Id. at 174.
188 Chambers have also been created under the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea. Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Eighth Session, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1980). This chamber would hear disputes concerning the
Seabed and other disputes which have as a basis the treaty. Id The use of chambers was also the
interesting suggestion to resolve disputes concerning cultural property. Ann P. Prunty, Toward Establishingan International Tribunalfor the Settlement of CulturalProperty Disputes: How to Keep
Greecefrom Losing its Marbles, 72 GEo. L.J. 1155, 1171 (1984).
189 The European Court of Human Rights is selected on a yearly basis. Sherman, supra note
186, at 313. The Court of Justice for the European Communities leaves the selection of judges
entirely to the Court. USHER, supra note 187, at 174.
190 The states participating in the European Convention on Human Rights are almost exclu-
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cessful than the I.C.J. in having their members submit disputes and adhere to the Court's decision. 19 1
Perhaps the problem of the international Court is that the states
who are party to the United Nations, or who could bring their dispute
before the International Court, simply do not trust the Court. 192 If those
who are to come before a Court do not trust it, then there is little that a
Court can do to gain respect for its decisions. It is doubtful whether
giving away an aspect of its power to the parties will increase trust in the
Court. Taking the long term view, a reasonable expectation is that the
result of letting parties pick judges will not increase trust, rather it will
create an expectation on the part of those using the Court that the Court
can and should be shaped to the disputants wishes rather than acting as a
full Court of Justice. In the future this may deprive the Court of its
opportunity to act as Court of Justice when international law has evolved
to the point where such a court would be used and trusted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Having examined both the present status of intervention under article 62, and the arguments against the validity of the chamber procedure,
the full Court should have addressed Nicaragua's application to intervene. While the Chamber has adopted a more flexible view of intervention, and made an historic decision of granting Nicaragua the right to
intervene in the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, the weight
of this precedent may not be given the same weight that a decision of the
full Court would receive.
In addition, the Chamber should not have decided this matter given
the unresolved issues surrounding the way the Chamber is presently
composed. As Judge Shahabuddeen stated, it is hard to see how a body
of judges substantially selected by the parties in a dispute could function
as the full court, which is to be the principal judicial body of the U.N.193
While the use of the chambers is a valuable device for resolving disputes,
the present manner by which those chambers are composed is contrary
sively European. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 256-259.
191 A study of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights shows that countries
that are signatories to the Convention of Human Rights have accepted the judgments of the Court,
even to the extent of altering domestic law to conform to the convention. J.A. Andrews, The European Jurisprudenceof Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REv. 463, 487-510 (1984). Under the convention,
all signatories may make a special declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
I. at 472. Only two signatories have failed to do so. Id. at 472 n.43.
192 See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary
Inquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123 (L.F. Damrosch ed.,

1987).
193 See Order of February 28, supra note 23, at 45.
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to the nature of the Court. Thus for the constitutional and policy reasons stated above, the full court was the proper body to hear Nicaragua's
application to intervene in the Land, Island, and Maritime FrontierDispute.
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